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Abstract
Mergers of community banks across economic market areas potentially reduce both
idiosyncratic and local market risk.  A merger may reduce idiosyncratic risk because the larger
post-merger bank has a larger customer base.  Negative credit and liquidity shocks from
individual customers would have smaller effects on the portfolio of the merged entity than on the
individual community banks involved in the merger.  Geographic dispersion of banking activities
across economic market areas may reduce local market risk because an adverse economic
development that is unique to one market area will not affect a bank’s loans to customers located
in another market area.
This paper simulates the mergers of community banks both within and across economic
market areas by combining their call report data.  We find that idiosyncratic risk reduction
dominates local market risk reduction.  In other words, a typical community bank can diversify
away its idiosyncratic risk almost as completely by merging with a bank across the street as it
can by merging with one located across the country.  The bulk of the pure portfolio
diversification effects for community banks, therefore, appear to be unrelated to diversification
across market areas but, instead, are related to bank size.  These findings help explain why many
community banks have not pursued geographic diversification more aggressively, but they beg
the question as to why more small community banks do not pursue in-market mergers.Scale Economies versus Geographic Diversification
in Community Bank Mergers
I.  Introduction
Largely as a result of previous branching restrictions, most U.S. banks are small
community banks.  As of March 2001, 58 percent of banks (4,732 of 8,174) operated with less
than $100 million in assets, and 95 percent of banks had fewer than $1 billion in assets.  In
addition, most U.S. banks have geographically concentrated operations.  As of June 2000, 62
percent of U.S. banks derived all of their deposits from offices in a single county.
Small community banks pose special challenges to bank supervisors because such banks
are more likely to fail than larger banks.  Shibut (2001) shows that failure rates and FDIC loss
rates decrease with bank size.  Should supervisors require small or geographically undiversified
banks to maintain higher capital ratios than other banks?  Should supervisors encourage banks to
undertake in-market or cross-market mergers to reduce risk?  Which type of merger would yield
the largest reduction in risk?  These questions are relevant for bank supervisors’ risk-focused
supervision of community banks (Board of Governors, 1997).  The objective of risk-focused
supervision is to identify factors that influence the risk assumed by banks, rather than just
focusing on their problem loans.  
In an analysis of the risk assumed by community banks, it is relevant to distinguish
between idiosyncratic risk and local market risk.  Idiosyncratic risk is unique to each bank.  The
factors that influence idiosyncratic risk include the quality of a bank’s management and the
ability of its borrowers to repay their loans.  Banks can reduce their idiosyncratic risk by merging
with other banks.  The larger the number of customers served by a bank, the smaller the effect of2
default by one borrower on the bank’s profits.  In theory a bank could reduce its idiosyncratic
risk by merging either with a bank located across the street or one located across the nation.
Two or more banks that have all of their offices in the same community are vulnerable to
local market risk.  That is, the chances that the customers of these banks will repay their loans
are affected by some of the same events.  Banks with all of their offices in the same community
cannot diversify their local market risk by merging with each other.  A bank reduces its market
risk by providing services to customers located in more than one community.  A bank that
operates all of its offices in one community could diversify its market risk by merging with
banks that operate offices in other communities.
A particular concern regarding geographically concentrated community banks is their
vulnerability to business cycle downturns.  Mergers may reduce the risk of insolvency through
scale effects or through geographic diversification effects, allowing more banks to remain viable
through business cycle troughs.  If geographical diversification benefits are important, then the
recent relaxation of intrastate and interstate branching may allow community banks to insulate
themselves better from deteriorating local economic conditions through merger activity.
We use a simulation technique that permits us to distinguish the effects of the scale of a
bank’s assets on risk (idiosyncratic risk) from the effects of the geographic dispersion of its
offices (local market risk).  Each bank in the sample is relatively small and has all of its offices
in one county.  We create a large number of hypothetical banks by merging the accounting
statements of the sample banks.  We identify local market areas as Labor Market Areas (LMAs).
The Bureau of Labor Statistics defines an LMA as an economically integrated geographic area
within which individuals can reside and find employment within a reasonable distance or can3
readily change employment without changing their place of residence.
1  Some LMAs are
Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), whereas other LMAs are single counties or groups of
counties not defined as MSAs.  We assume that banks located in the same LMA are affected by
similar economic forces.  Some of the hypothetical banks have all of their offices in the same
LMA and other hypothetical banks have offices dispersed over wide geographic areas.  We
calculate several risk measures for each of the merged banks and compare them with the risk
measures of the sample banks.
We examine the effects of mergers on risk in two dimensions.  Among hypothetical
banks with all of their offices in the same LMAs, we examine the effects of scale on the
measures of risk by increasing the number of sample banks merged into the hypothetical banks.
We examine the effects of the geographic dispersion of banking offices on risk by expanding the
geographic dispersion of the sample banks, holding constant the number of sample banks merged
into the hypothetical banks.  At one extreme, each hypothetical bank has all of its offices in one
LMA; at the other extreme, each hypothetical bank has offices in more than one Census division
of the nation. 
Our results indicate that community banks can reduce their pro-forma risk through
mergers.  Scale economies dominate the benefits of geographic diversification in community
bank mergers.  Mergers of banks with all of their offices in the same LMA have about the same
effects on risk as mergers of banks with offices in different parts of the nation.
                                                
1 Bureau of Labor Statistics (January 2001).4
II.  Overview and Literature Review
Diamond (1984) formalized the basic intuition of portfolio diversification as a source of
risk reduction for banks.  Diamond’s insight was that a bank, as an investor in risky assets,
benefits from portfolio diversification.  A bank could reduce the default risk of its portfolio of
assets without a corresponding decline in expected return by combining assets with payoffs that
are less than perfectly correlated.  In other words, a bank can operate on a more favorable risk-
return frontier by increasing the diversification of its portfolio of assets—in principle, without
limit.
Diversification through increasing scale.  In practice, no market economy comes close to
a monolithic banking-sector structure.  A voluminous literature has attempted to answer the
question, “Why aren’t banks few in number and very large, as Diamond predicted?”  An
important part of the answer involves restraining and offsetting effects.  Government regulation
of industry structure in all market economies prevents a monopoly bank from forming; in the
United States, chartering restrictions and merger guidelines tend to keep individual banks small
with respect to the size of the national economy (and relative to leading firms in other
industries).  However, economic rather than regulatory (antitrust) constraints are more relevant in
the vast majority of actual or potential bank mergers (Kwast, 1999, pp. 634-35).
The literature also has identified economic reasons why banks remain much smaller than
Diamond’s theory predicts.  In particular, there appear to be diseconomies of scale—due to
managerial inefficiencies, for example—that offset pure portfolio-diversification effects as a
bank becomes larger.  Organizational diseconomies may, in fact, increase at an increasing rate
while increasing scale economies deliver efficiency gains at a decreasing rate.5
Studies using many different datasets and methodologies have identified a maximum
efficient scale for U.S. banking organizations that lies far below the largest existing institutions,
each of which, in turn, represents only a small fraction of the entire banking sector.  Most
estimates of maximum efficient scale lie in the range of $100 million to $25 billion of assets
(Berger, et al. 1999, pp. 158-59), whereas the largest U.S. banks have hundreds of billions of
dollars of assets, and total banking assets are measured in the trillions of dollars.  A recent set of
empirical estimates based on several parametric and non-parametric estimation methods, for the
period 1985-94, locates maximum efficient scale between $300 million and $500 million of
assets (Wheelock and Wilson, 2001).  On average, banks below this range face increasing returns
to scale, while banks in or above the range face constant or decreasing returns to scale.
Diversification through geographic or industry risk-pooling.  Beginning in the 1980s,
banking crises occurred in different regions of the country and among banks that had specialized
in different economic sectors, such as agriculture, energy, or commercial real estate.  Many
researchers suggested that greater portfolio diversification—with associated improvements in the
risk-return frontier facing many banks—might be achieved not through greater scale but by
pooling exposures to a variety of “environmental portfolios” (defined by Gunther and Robinson
(1999) in terms of industries and/or geographic locations).  Many papers identify hypothetical or
actual cost-, risk-, or profit-efficiency gains through greater geographic or industry
diversification (Liang and Rhoades, 1988; Boyd, et al. 1993; Levonian, 1994; Rose, 1996;
Demsetz and Strahan, 1997; Rivard and Thomas, 1997; Gunther and Robinson, 1999; Laderman,
1999; Hughes, et al., 1999; Allen and Jagtiani, 2000; Berger and DeYoung, forthcoming).
Because most of these papers have focused on medium- or large-sized banks, it is not clear
whether these conclusions apply to small banks.6
There are two issues concerning potential risk-reduction gains from geographic
diversification that are particularly important for smaller banks.  First, given that diversification
gains from increasing scale may not be exhausted for these banks, geographic-diversification
gains may turn out to be relatively small and unimportant in comparison.  Second, greater
geographic dispersion of a small bank’s operations may induce significant operational
inefficiencies, detracting from the potential benefits of geographic diversification.    
Which type of diversification—increasing scale or geographic diversity— is more
important for community banks?  Many studies find that geographic- or industry-diversification
benefits are available to medium- and large-sized banks, while scale economies are not.  These
conclusions may not hold for small banks.  In fact, the reverse could be true.
In theory, all banks—including small ones—could benefit from geographic
diversification.  However, Neely and Wheelock (1997) find that small banks are not well
diversified geographically.  Profit-maximizing owners of small banks may not expect geographic
expansion to be profitable.  Alternatively, Meyer and Yeager (2001) show that small rural banks
are not particularly exposed to local (county-level) economic fluctuations, so expansion into the
immediate surrounding area may not deliver much geographic-diversification benefit.   
Diversification benefits from increasing scale, on the other hand, appear plentiful for
small banks.  Boyd and Graham (1998) find significant cost- and profit-efficiency gains after
small-bank mergers, whereas most studies find no such gains on average for medium and larger
banks.  Berger (1998) studies "megamergers" (greater than $1 billion in resulting assets) and
"minimergers" (less than $1 billion) separately and finds that the degree of overlap between
merging banks (either mega or mini) has no independent effect on cost, profit, or "alternative7
profit" efficiency gains.  This result implies in-market and out-of-market mergers of small banks
have about the same effect  in terms of risk reduction.
In a study of 7,000 banks, Berger and DeYoung (2001) present evidence that is consistent
with the conclusion that geographic expansion may be quite costly for small banks.  They find
that the ability of a banking organization to impose its standard for efficient operation diminishes
as the distance increases between the headquarters of the banking organization and a bank
affiliate.  Berger and DeYoung conclude that there is no particular optimal geographic scope for
a banking organization.  Whalen (2001) finds that small banks with all of their offices located in
one community tend to be more profitable than small banks with offices in more than one
community.  This result also is consistent with the observation that small banks are justified in
remaining undiversified geographically.  Finally, Rose and Wolken (1990) find that banks
associated with geographically diversified holding companies have no competitive advantage
over independent banks.
III.  Methodology
Several complications arise when studying the effects of bank mergers on risk.  These
complications include (1) isolating scale effects from geographic diversification effects, (2)
controlling for sequential mergers, (3) controlling for banks with different initial levels of
geographic diversification, and (4) accounting for the endogeneity between risk and return.  As
we explain below, our simulation method controls for these complications.  Simulation has its
own limitations as a means of studying the effects of mergers on risk.  We argue, however, that
our simulation technique allows us to distinguish more clearly between the effects on risk of8
scale and geographic dispersion of banking offices than the studies that use data for actual banks
with different degrees of geographic dispersion among their offices.
A potential problem researchers confront when comparing pre- and post-merger bank risk
is separating scale effects from geographic diversification benefits.  Bank mergers may reduce
idiosyncratic risk because the post-merger bank has a larger customer base.  Negative credit and
liquidity shocks from individual customers have smaller effects on the overall portfolios of larger
banks.  The scale effects of mergers on risk are likely to be small for banks that are large prior to
the mergers because these banks diversified away much of their idiosyncratic risk before
merging.  The effects of scale on risk may be larger for mergers among community banks. 
Sequential mergers may also create challenges for measuring the effects of mergers on
risk.  Ideally, we would like to measure the effects of mergers over a consistent period of time.
To illustrate, suppose Bank A merges with Bank B at the same time that Bank D merges with
Bank E.  Two years hence, however, the post-merger Bank A-B merges again, this time with
Bank C.  Because of the sequential merger, risk reduction benefits from the mergers that created
Bank A-B-C cannot be compared directly to risk reduction benefits from the mergers that created
Bank D-E.
Another challenge in measuring the effects of mergers on risk involves adjusting for the
initial degree of geographic diversification of banks prior to mergers.  If greater dispersion of
offices reduces banking risk, the effects of a merger on risk will depend on the degree to which
the banks involved in a merger had exploited the benefits of geographic diversification prior to
the merger.
A fourth complication in studying bank mergers is that the tradeoff between risk and
return is endogenous.  After two or more banks merge, bank management may respond to an9
advantageous shift in the risk-return frontier by changing its portfolio of assets in a way that
increases its expected return.  Even though the bank is operating on a more favorable risk-return
frontier, measured risk may decrease, increase, or remain unchanged.  Boyd and Gertler (1994)
and Boyd and Runkle (1993) present evidence that larger banks tend to choose riskier portfolios
of assets.
Our methodology controls for these four complications.  We use bank call report data
from the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) to simulate the effects on
risk of mergers among community banks.  The simulated mergers take place at the beginning of
1989.  We track performance measures of the merged banks over a ten-year period through year-
end 1998.  Using merger data from the FFIEC and Summary of Deposits data from the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), we include only
banks that did not merge and had all of their deposits in a single county between 1989 and 1998.
These criteria for the sample banks control for sequential mergers and different initial levels of
diversification.  In addition, we separate scale effects from geographic diversity effects by
simulating mergers across geographic boundaries and comparing those results with the in-market
mergers, which  capture only scale effects.  Additional risk reduction across markets must result
from geographic diversification benefits. Finally, the simulated-merger approach eliminates the
endogeneity of the risk-return frontier.  Because the mergers are artificial, bank managers do not
have the opportunity to change their behavior.  We capture the pro forma effects of mergers on
risk for given portfolios of assets.
The technique of simulating mergers has some limitations as a means of analyzing the
effects of actual mergers on risk.  In particular, simulated mergers do not account for economies
of scope.  By combining operations, a merged bank may be able to produce its array of products10
at a lower cost than the unmerged banks.  The inability of merger simulations to measure
economies of scope understates the potential merger benefits.  In contrast, actual mergers may
have more negative effects on bank performance than indicated by the simulations because of the
challenges of managing larger banks with offices dispersed over wider geographic areas.  Thus,
the potential biases inherent in our simulation technique are two-sided and it is not obvious
whether our results will understate or overstate merger benefits.
Despite these limitations, the simulation approach yields a clean analysis of the scale and
geographic diversification benefits from community bank mergers.  In-market risk reduction, for
example, must be driven by scale economies, not by economies of scope or changes in
managerial control.  Further risk reduction from out-of-market mergers results from geographic
diversification benefits. In addition, studies of actual mergers may create distortions in the
measures of risk because banks often incur one-time expenses associated with mergers.  A time
series of the profit rate of a bank that was involved in a series of mergers will reflect a series of
one-time expenses.  Simulations avoid these accounting issues.
Other studies in the banking literature analyze the effects of mergers on risk through
simulation.  Boyd, Graham and Hewitt (1993), Laderman (1999) and Allen and Jagtiani (2000)
analyze the effects on risk of mergers among banks and firms in other financial industries by
measuring the risk of hypothetical financial conglomerates created by combining the data for
banks and nonbank financial firms.  Our approach, instead, simulates the effects of mergers on
risk within the banking industry. 
We conduct the merger simulations along two dimensions.  The first dimension is the
number of banks involved in the merger, holding constant the geographic dispersion of the
offices of the banks involved in the merger.  The number of banks varies from two to five.  We11
limit the number of sample banks in the mergers because relatively few LMAs have more than
five community banks that qualify for our sample.  The second dimension is the degree of
geographic dispersion of banking offices, holding constant the number of banks involved in the
merger.  We specify four categories of geographic dispersion.  The first category has no
geographic diversification in that the banks in each merger are located in the same LMA.  The
second category of geographic dispersion involves mergers of banks located in the same state but
in different LMAs.  The third category is banks located in different states but in the same Census
division.  The Census Bureau identifies nine mutually exclusive Census divisions, each
composed of contiguous states.  The final category of geographic dispersion is banks located in
different Census divisions.
Because each of the two dimensions has four categories, we simulate 16 merger
scenarios.  We first select a pair of banks at random from the same LMA, then three banks, four
banks, and five banks.  We then select two banks at random from different LMAs but the same
state, then three banks, and so forth.  We do the same for banks in the same and then different
Census divisions.   For each of the 16 simulation scenarios, we use sampling without
replacement to create up to 1,000 hypothetical mergers.  The actual number of mergers is far less
than 1,000 in several of the 16 scenarios because in many cases too few sample banks fit the
criteria for selection.  Finally, we run separate simulations for urban banks (in an MSA) and rural
banks (not in an MSA) because their initial risk characteristics were quite different.  Rural banks
had significantly lower risk levels than urban banks.  Table 1 lists the number of hypothetical
mergers for each of the 16 merger scenarios for both the urban and rural banks.  The number of
hypothetical mergers among banks located in the same LMAs declines precipitously as the12
number of sample banks in each merger increases from two to five.  The numbers of mergers in
the other scenarios fall off more slowly.
IV.  Risk Measures
We simulate the effects of mergers on several measures of the risk assumed by banks:
estimated failure probability, insolvency risk, and variance of return on average assets (ROA).
1.  SEER Failure Probabilities
One of the models the Federal Reserve System uses for bank surveillance is the System
for Estimating Examination Ratings (SEER) risk rank model, which is designed to estimate the
probability that a bank will fail over the next two years based on current call report data.  We use
the SEER risk rank model to calculate the probability of failure by each bank in our sample and
each hypothetical bank created by merging the call report data of the sample banks.  Due to the
paucity of bank failures since the early 1990s, the coefficients of the SEER risk rank model have
been “frozen” since 1991.  Gilbert, Meyer and Vaughan (forthcoming) conclude that this model
continues to be relevant for bank surveillance.  They found that the SEER risk rank model
predicted the banks that would be classified as problem banks in future periods almost as
accurately as a model designed to predict problem bank status that is re-estimated each year.
The fact that the coefficients of the SEER risk rank model do not change over time is an
advantage for this study, since the predictions of the model provide a consistent risk measure
over time.
One of the independent variables in the SEER risk rank model is the asset size of the
bank.  The hypothetical banks created through simulated mergers tend to have lower
probabilities of failure simply because their assets are larger than those of each of the sample13
banks used for created the merged banks.  We want to determine the degree to which mergers
reduce the probability of bank failure independent of these increases in total assets.  Our
adjustment involves measuring the total assets of the merged banks as the average assets of the
sample banks used in the hypothetical mergers.  For example, if we merge a bank with $40
million in assets and a bank with $60 million in assets, we compute the merged bank’s failure
probability as if its assets were $50 million.
We compute three risk measures using estimates of failure probabilities.
Failure Probability above Two Percent -- Surveillance staff at the Board of Governors put
a bank on the Federal Reserve watch list if its failure probability is above two percent.
Surveillance staff at the relevant District bank are expected to monitor closely the bank’s
condition.  The first risk measure is based on the two percent threshold for failure probabilities.
We compute the ratio of the total number of quarters that the merged banks’ failure probabilities
cross the two-percent threshold relative to the average number of quarters that the unmerged
banks’ failure probabilities cross the two-percent threshold. 
The following example illustrates how this risk ratio is calculated.  We simulated 893
mergers of banks located in rural LMAs with other sample banks located in their same LMAs.
In each of these simulated mergers we combine the call report data of a bank identified as
“Entity 1” with the call report data of another bank in the same LMA, which we call “Entity 2.”
For each entity, we compute the probability of failure 37 times over the 40 quarters between
1989 and 1998.  The first three quarters were needed for the computations.  The maximum
number of quarters, therefore, that all 893 banks chosen as Entity 1 in these simulated mergers
could have exceeded the two-percent failure probability threshold was 33,041 (893 banks x 37
quarters per bank).  In fact, 1283 quarterly failure probabilities exceeded two percent.  Using the14
same logic, the maximum number of times that all 893 banks chosen as Entity 2 could have
exceeded the two-percent failure probability threshold was 33,041.  In fact, failure probabilities
at all Entity 2 banks exceeded two percent 1009 times.  Failure probabilities for all the merged
entities exceeded 2 percent 513 times.  The ratio of the total number of quarters that the merged
banks’ failure probabilities crossed the two-percent threshold (513) relative to the average
number of quarters that the unmerged banks’ failure probabilities crossed the two-percent
threshold ((1283 +1009)/2) is 44.8 percent.  Lower ratios indicate lower risk of failure for the
merged entities relative to the actual entities.
Failure Probability in the Top Ten Percent -- Despite the Board of Governors’ monitoring
list criterion, one could argue that a two-percent failure probability threshold is somewhat
arbitrary, especially because the bank samples differ significantly depending on the number of
banks used in the mergers and the degree of geographic dispersion specified.  As an alternative
to the two percent threshold for failure probabilities, we substitute the 90
th percentile of failure
probabilities among the sample banks.  That is, we compute the number of bank quarters in
which the failure probabilities of the merged entities exceeded the 90
th percentile as a percentage
of the average number of bank quarters that the failure probabilities of the sample banks
exceeded the 90
th percentile. Again, the lower the percentage, the greater the risk reduction from
bank mergers.
Mean Failure Probability -- The final SEER risk measure is the mean SEER failure
probability.  For example, in the scenario of two banks located in the same LMA, we compute
the mean failure probability for the banks selected as Entity 1, for the second set of banks
selected as Entity 2, and for the merged banks.  We do this for each merger scenario and then15
compare the mean failure probabilities across the sixteen scenarios.  All else equal, lower mean
failure probabilities indicate greater risk reduction. 
2.  Insolvency Risk Index 





























where (sd ROA) t,t+15 =  standard deviation of ROA between quarters t and t+15,
E(ROA)t,t+15 =  expected value of ROA between quarters t and t+15,
(EQ/TA)t+15  =  equity to total assets at time t + 15.
Intuitively, the insolvency risk index is a measure of the likelihood that a negative shock to
earnings will deplete bank capital.  The higher the insolvency risk index, the greater the
probability that negative earnings will leave equity negative.
Unlike the SEER failure probability model, the insolvency risk index for each bank is
based on a time series of its ROA.  Consistent with Rivard and Thomas (1997), we use a sixteen-
quarter horizon to calculate the standard deviation and expected value of ROA. To make the
index forward looking, we measure the ratio of equity to assets as of the end of each period for
measuring ROA.  For each bank chosen to simulate a merger and for each merged bank, we
calculate the insolvency risk index on a rolling basis 25 times and then compute the average of
those values.
As with the SEER failure probabilities, we compute a threshold for relatively high values
of the insolvency risk index as the 90
th percentile for the sample banks used for simulating16
mergers.  We calculate the number of bank quarters that the insolvency risk index for the merged
banks exceed this threshold relative to the average number of bank quarters that the insolvency
risk index for the sample banks exceed the threshold.  The lower this percentage, the greater the
risk reduction through mergers.  We call this risk measure the “insolvency tenth percentile.”
We also compute the mean insolvency risk indices for each of the 16 sets of merged
banks.  All else equal, the lower the mean insolvency risk index of the merged banks, the greater
the risk-reduction benefit from the mergers.
3.  Variance of ROA
The final risk measure is the average variance of ROA.  We expect the merged banks to
have smaller variance of ROA if the mergers reduce idiosyncratic or market risk.  We calculate
the variance of ROA for each merged bank over the full 40 quarters and then average those
variances over the merged banks in each of the sixteen merger scenarios.
V.  Bank Sample
Despite including only banks that had all of their deposits in a single county each quarter
between 1989 and 1998 and had no merger activity over the same period, the remaining bank
sample included a few extremely large banks such as credit card banks and separately charted
entities of large financial institutions.  Because the focus of our research is on community banks,
we imposed an asset size limit of $400 million, which excluded the top one percent of the banks
that met the criteria for remaining in the sample.  The remaining sample of 4,250 banks used for
creating mergers represented all 50 states and, therefore, all nine Census division.  At the end of17
the period, median asset size was $49.1 million and average asset size was $68.3 million.  Just 33
percent of the banks operated in MSAs; the rest were rural banks.
Urban banks in our sample have higher risk measures on average than the rural banks in
the sample.  This difference creates a potential bias in the comparisons of risk measures for the
hypothetical banks in our merger scenarios because some simulations pull a higher percentage of
banks from urban areas.  For example, in the two-bank same-LMA mergers, 36 percent of the
sample banks are located in urban areas.  In contrast, urban banks account for 57 percent of the
sample banks in the five-bank same-LMA simulations because the economic market must be
relatively large to support five banks.  The mean failure probability of the sample banks in the
two-bank mergers is 1.01 percent compared with 1.44 percent for the sample banks in the five-
bank mergers.  The risk measures, therefore, increase with the percentage of urban banks drawn
from the sample.  We adjust for this effect by reporting the results separately for urban and rural
banks.
VI.  Results
The first risk measure that we report is the mean SEER failure probability.  To verify that
the merged banks had significantly lower mean failure probabilities than the sample banks that
contributed to the mergers, we conducted t-tests of the differences in mean failure probabilities
between each set of banks that contributed to a given merger and the merged banks.  The null
hypothesis that the means are equal is rejected at the one percent level for each of the 11218
comparisons, implying that the merged banks have significantly lower mean failure probabilities
than the unmerged entities.
2
Results from mean SEER failure probabilities indicate that mergers reduce significantly
both idiosyncratic and local market risk.  Both rural and urban banks reduce their mean SEER
failure probabilities by increasing their scale of operations. The results are reported in Table 2.
Idiosyncratic risk reduction is observed by reading across a given row, which  holds constant the
degree of geographic dispersion while increasing the number of banks in the mergers. For
example, the mean failure probability that results from a merger of  two rural banks in the same
state is 0.25 percent, while a merger of five rural banks in the same state reduces the failure
probability to 0.09 percent.  
We tested whether the idiosyncratic risk reductions as measured by mean failure
probabilities were statistically significant.  Specifically, we conducted t-tests comparing, for a
given level of geographic diversification, the mean SEER failure probability of a two-bank
merger with the failure probability of a three-, four-, and then five-bank merger.   We also
compared a three-bank merger with a four-bank merger, and so on.  There were six t-test
comparisons for each level of geographic diversification resulting in 24 t-tests overall for each
set of rural and urban banks.  In general, we found that idiosyncratic risk reduction was
statistically significant at the five percent level for all but the in-market mergers for both rural
and urban banks.  The lack of statistical significance for the in-market mergers appears to be
driven by the small bank samples and the relatively high standard deviation of failure
probabilities from the two-bank mergers.
                                                
2 There are 14 t-test comparisons (2+3+4+5) for each level of geographic diversification.  Given the four
diversification categories and the urban/rural sample split, we obtain 112 (14 x 4 x 2) comparisons.19
Although community bank mergers reduce idiosyncratic risk, market risk is not affected
significantly.  Market risk reduction is observed by reading down a given column in Table 2
because the number of banks participating in mergers is held constant while the degree of
geographic dispersion increases.  For example, the mean SEER failure probability at urban banks
declines from 1.37 percent to 0.94 percent when a two-bank merger moves from the same LMA
to different Census divisions.  We conducted t-tests of the differences in mean failure
probabilities across geographic boundaries, holding the number of banks in the merger constant.
With minor exceptions, the t-tests consistently fail to reject at the five percent level of
significance the hypothesis that the means are equal.  In other words, geographical
diversification per se has a statistically insignificant effect on community bank risk.  A bank can
reduce its risk as much by merging with another bank in the same labor market area as it can by
merging with a bank in a different part of the state or country.
Although mean SEER probabilities are useful measures of bank risk, bank supervisors
often are more interested in the outliers in the upper tail of the distribution.  Figure 1 plots the
ratio of the number of bank quarters that the SEER failure probabilities of the merged rural banks
exceeded two percent relative to the average number of bank quarters that the SEER failure
probabilities of the unmerged rural banks exceeded two percent (the SEER two percent
threshold).  Merger results suggest that risk-reducing economies of scale are significant and
diminish rapidly at rural banks.  Idiosyncratic risk reduction is measured as the absolute value of
the slope of each of the four curves.  In particular, the ratio drops to less than half for two-bank
mergers and declines more slowly thereafter, falling to one-fourth and lower for three or more
banks involved in a merger.  The implication is that a rural community bank’s risk of exceeding20
a SEER failure probability of two percent is cut in half  by merging with a bank from the same
labor market area, and is reduced to one-fourth or more by merging with three or more banks.   
The idiosyncratic risk of urban bank mergers falls more slowly.  As Figure 2 illustrates, a
two-bank merger reduces by about one-fourth the ratio of bank quarters with SEER failure
probabilities above two percent.  The ratio declines to about 55 percent for in-market and in-state
mergers, and to about 30 percent for same-census and cross-census mergers as the number of
banks that contribute to a merger increases to five. 
For both rural and urban banks, the absolute value of the slope of each of the lines
decreases with the number of merged banks, suggesting that the marginal idiosyncratic risk
reduction from adding one more bank to the merger declines.  In other words, risk reduction
from scale effects diminishes rapidly.
Reduction in market risk using the two-percent SEER threshold is relatively small for
rural bank mergers but larger for urban bank mergers.  Market risk reduction is measured in
Figures 1 and 2 as the vertical distances between the lines given the number of banks
participating in the merger.  For example, the ratio of bank quarters that a rural four-bank in-
market merger exceeds the two-percent SEER threshold is 25.5 percent; the same ratio for a rural
four-bank cross-census merger is just 12.6 percent.  For urban banks the market risk reduction
from a four-bank merger falls from 60.3 percent to 43.0 percent as the merger banks go from in-
market to cross-census.  The reduction in market risk increases with the number of banks
involved in the merger.  In other words, the geographic diversification of banks in a five-bank
merger is more important than the geographic diversification of banks in a two-bank merger.
The final SEER risk measure—the SEER tenth percentile—confirms the importance of
idiosyncratic risk reduction from mergers.  The results, illustrated in Figure 3, are nearly21
identical to the two-percent SEER threshold risk measures.  For example, idiosyncratic risk at
rural banks falls from 51.9 percent for two-bank in-market mergers to 25.8 percent for five-bank
in-market mergers.  Again, idiosyncratic risk reduction at urban banks is less pronounced.
Figure 4 shows that the ratio of urban banks with failure probabilities in the top ten percent of the
distribution decline from 72.5 percent for a two-bank in-market merger to 48.7 percent for a five-
bank merger.
Also consistent with the two-percent threshold results, geographic diversification benefits
as measured by the SEER tenth percentile measure are present at rural banks but much larger at
the urban banks.  For example, the ratio of urban four-bank mergers still in the top tenth
percentile falls from 53.1 percent for in-market mergers to 38.8 percent for cross-census mergers,
a decline of 14.3 percentage points.  The same ratios for rural four-bank mergers are 26.5 percent
and 17.8 percent, respectively, a decline of just 8.7 percentage points.  Nevertheless, market risk
reduction is far less pronounced than idiosyncratic risk reduction in both rural and urban bank
mergers.
Results from the insolvency risk indices confirm the importance of idiosyncratic risk
reduction while discounting the benefits from market risk reduction.  Fully 88 of the 112 t-tests
of the differences between the mean insolvency indices of the unmerged banks and their merged
counterparts were significant at the five percent level, indicating that community bank mergers
reduce significantly insolvency risk.
Mean insolvency risk declines significantly as the number of banks involved in a merger
increase.  Table 3 reports the results.  For example, the mean insolvency index for cross-census
mergers goes from 3.92 in a rural two-bank merger to 2.83 in a rural five-bank merger.  T-tests
of the differences in means of the merged banks overwhelmingly reject the hypothesis that the22
means are the same, indicating that idiosyncratic risk decreases with bank size, both at rural and
urban banks.
Geographic diversification, in contrast, fails to reduce insolvency risk.  Indeed, the mean
insolvency risk actually increases with diversification in some urban bank merger scenarios.  For
example, the mean insolvency risk for a three-bank in-market merger is 4.73; that index rises to
5.33 in a three-bank cross-census merger.  T-tests overwhelmingly fail to reject at the five
percent level of significance the hypothesis that insolvency risk indices are similar across
different levels of geographic diversification for a given number of banks included in the
mergers.
Insolvency outlier results are consistent with the results from the mean insolvency risk
indices.  Idiosyncratic risk reduction at rural banks from scale effects is represented in Figure 5
as the absolute values of the slopes of the four curves.  This figure plots the insolvency tenth
percentile risk measure.  The striking feature of this plot is how close the lines are to one another,
suggesting that the degree of geographic diversity has little impact on insolvency risk.  Figure 6
plots the similar risk measures for urban banks.  Although idiosyncratic risk declines with the
number of banks in a merger, the results are not consistent with the hypothesis that greater
geographic diversification of banking offices reduces risk.  
The final risk measure that we examine is the mean variance of ROA.  Because
idiosyncratic and market risk should decrease with size and the geographic dispersion of banking
offices, respectively, we expect the variance of ROA to decrease with both the number of banks
in the mergers and the geographic dispersion of offices.  T-test comparisons of the differences in
means of the variance of ROA between the unmerged banks and their merged counterparts show
that 87 of 112 are significant at the five percent level, suggesting that community bank mergers23
reduce significantly the variance of ROA.  Most of the comparisons in which the hypothesis that
the means are the same cannot be rejected are drawn from the urban bank sample, which has a
much higher standard deviation of ROA.
Our results suggest that increasing scale through mergers significantly reduces the
variance of ROA.  Table 4 presents the mean variance of ROA for each of the sixteen merger
scenarios for both rural and urban banks.  The variance of ROA declines considerably across
each of the rows.  For example, the mean variance of ROA at urban banks declines from 0.93
percent in a two-bank same-census merger to 0.45 percent in a five-bank same-census merger.
T-tests of differences in the mean variance of ROA across merger scenarios strongly reject the
hypothesis that the means are the same.  The only exception occurs when going from a four-bank
merger to a five-bank merger.  In other words, idiosyncratic risk is reduced significantly through
mergers, but the benefits are nearly exhausted after four banks contribute to the merger.
Once again, market risk reduction through mergers is absent.  Reading down a given
column in Table 4, one finds that the mean variance of ROA barely decreases and at times
increases, especially at urban banks.  T-test comparisons fail to detect significant differences
between the means.  
Our merger simulation results consistently suggest that risk economies of scale are
present in community banking.  Banks can reduce their idiosyncratic risk by merging with other
banks, thereby obtaining more loan customers and depositors.  The potential for a few of those
loans or depositors to push a community bank to the brink of insolvency decreases with the
bank’s size.  On the other hand, community banks do not decrease significantly their local
market risk by diversifying geographically.  From a purely risk-reducing perspective, bank24
supervisors should look favorably on community bank mergers, regardless of the location of the
bank offices being merged.
VII.  Conclusions
Community banks appear to assume more risk than larger banks.  This pattern raises the
following issues for bank supervision.  Does the risk assumed by community banks reflect their
small size, the geographic concentration of their banking offices, or both?  Should supervisors
urge community banks to merge with other local banks in order to reap the benefits of larger
scale, or penalized if they don’t?  Should supervisors encourage banks to establish offices over
wider geographic areas, or assess special penalties, such as higher capital requirements, against
geographically undiversified community banks?  
This paper simulates community bank mergers both within and across economic market
areas.  We use several measures of risk that are relevant to bank supervisors to assess how
effective various merger strategies might be in reducing risk.  We find that the greatest
diversification benefits are achieved by increasing a community bank’s size, wherever the
merger partner is located.  We interpret this first-order risk reduction as the pooling of banks’
idiosyncratic risks.  Further risk reduction by diversifying across different market areas may be
possible, but it appears to be of second-order importance at best.
Risk economies of scale at community banks imply that, all else equal, larger banks can
withstand business cycle downturns better than smaller banks.  Our findings suggest that the
historical barriers to intrastate and interstate banking have not been the primary barriers to risk
reduction for community banks except to the extent that such barriers prevented mergers from
taking place at all even within market.25
These findings may help explain why many community banks have not pursued
geographic diversification more aggressively since branching restrictions have been relaxed.
Given the operational difficulties and risk-management challenges of expanding into new market
areas, many small banks may have decided that the unique contribution that geographic
diversification can make to risk reduction is insufficient.  Community banks logically would
pursue in-market expansion opportunities before looking outside the local market area.
The significant risk-reduction benefits of in-market mergers we find raise an obvious
question: why haven’t more community banks merged with other local banks already?  At least
three possibilities are worth mentioning.  First, we simply may be in the midst of a consolidation
wave that will take many years to play out.  Small banks may understand the benefits but are not
able to find the right merger partner immediately.  Second, anti-trust guidelines may constrain
consolidation in some small market areas.  That is, banks in a concentrated market area (as
defined by the merger guidelines used by the regulators) may be prohibited from merging with
each other, even though there might be efficiency and/or risk-reduction benefits.  Finally, the
objectives of closely held community banks may not be profit-maximization or risk
minimization.  If community bank owners enjoy some non-financial benefits of control, such as
community prestige or stature, they may pass up opportunities to merge that would involve
losing these benefits.26
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653-74.Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 893 489 258 133
Same state 994 972 733 583
Same Census division 999 858 647 505
Different Census division 1000 944 715 567
Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 620 359 242 171
Same state 618 391 270 216
Same Census division 565 331 237 185
Different Census division 697 465 348 278
Urban Banks
Number of simulations conducted
TABLE 1
Number of simulations conducted
Rural Banks
This table lists the number of merger simulations run for each of the
merger scenarios. We restricted the simulations to a maximum of
1,000. The number of simulations declines rapidly for mergers in the
same labor market area (LMA) as the number of banks in the merger
increase because a relatively small number of LMA's contain several
community banks with all deposits in a single county and no merger
activity between 1989 and 1998. Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 0.22 0.13 0.12 0.11
     (standard deviations) (1.12) (0.66) (0.65) (0.57)
Same state 0.25 0.16 0.11 0.09
(1.18) (0.68) (0.49) (0.27)
Same Census division 0.22 0.14 0.09 0.06
(0.86) (0.74) (0.28) (0.14)
Different Census division 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.06
(0.80) (0.43) (0.21) (0.10)
Average of unmerged banks: 0.54
Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 1.37 0.86 0.87 0.84
(5.02) (2.93) (3.41) (3.12)
Same state 1.10 1.01 0.81 0.77
(3.22) (3.14) (3.02) (2.41)
Same Census division 0.90 0.51 0.49 0.34
(2.79) (1.74) (2.03) (1.46)
Different Census division 0.94 0.82 0.48 0.41
(2.92) (3.06) (1.46) (1.32)
Average of unmerged banks: 2.03
TABLE 2
Number of banks in merger
Number of banks in merger
Mean SEER Failure Probability of Urban Banks
This table lists the mean SEER failure probability percentages for the merged rural and
urban banks for each of the sixteen merger scenarios. Idiosyncratic risk reduction is
observed by reading across a given row because the rows hold the degree of geographical
diversification constant while increasing the number of banks that participate in a
hypotheteical merger. In contrast, market risk reduction is observed by reading down a
given column because the number of banks participating in a merger is held constant
while the degree of geographical diversification increases. Each merged failure
probability is significantly lower than the average pre-merger failure probability for the
sample banks, which was 0.54 percent for rural banks and 2.03 percent for urban banks.
The results--confirmed by t-tests--suggest that community bank mergers reduce
significantly idiosyncratic risk. Market risk reduction is less important, but the decline in
market risk is more pronounced as the number of banks involved in a given merger
increases.
Mean SEER Failure Probability of Rural BanksDegree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 3.95 3.39 3.13 2.85
     (standard deviations) (2.80) (2.10) (1.80) (1.50)
Same state 3.96 3.40 3.09 2.83
(2.88) (2.29) (1.86) (1.49)
Same Census division 3.95 3.36 3.02 2.78
(2.79) (2.27) (1.74) (1.39)
Different Census division 3.92 3.39 3.03 2.83
(2.82) (2.23) (1.75) (1.50)
Average of unmerged banks: 6.95
Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 5.92 4.73 4.52 4.10
(7.66) (4.30) (3.81) (3.33)
Same state 5.70 5.04 4.45 4.28
(5.80) (4.69) (4.33) (3.86)
Same Census division 5.41 4.54 4.20 3.78
(5.34) (4.10) (3.60) (2.94)
Different Census division 5.95 5.33 4.64 4.32
(6.79) (6.00) (4.01) (3.73)
Average of unmerged banks: 8.89
TABLE 3
Mean Insolvency Risk of Merged Banks
This table lists the mean insolvency risk indices for the merged rural and urban banks for
each of the sixteen merger scenarios. Idiosyncratic risk reduction is observed by reading
across a given row because the rows hold the degree of geographical diversification
constant while increasing the number of banks that participate in a hypotheteical merger.
In contrast, market risk reduction is observed by reading down a given column because
the number of banks participating in a merger is held constant while the degree of
geographical diversification increases. Most mean insolvency indices for the merged
banks are significantly lower than the mean pre-merger insolvency inidices for the
sample banks, which was 6.95 for rural banks and 8.89 for urban banks. The results--
confirmed by t-tests--suggest that community bank mergers reduce significantly
idiosyncratic risk.  Market risk reduction is insignificant.
Number of banks in merger
Rural Banks
Urban Banks
Number of banks in mergerDegree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 0.40 0.28 0.22 0.18
     (standard deviations) (0.79) (0.42) (0.29) (0.22)
Same state 0.42 0.31 0.23 0.20
(0.80) (0.72) (0.38) (0.35)
Same Census division 0.42 0.30 0.24 0.18
(0.87) (0.88) (0.45) (0.26)
Different Census division 0.44 0.29 0.23 0.19
(1.80) (0.55) (0.40) (0.29)
Average of unmerged banks: 0.97
Degree of diversification 2345
Same LMA 1.05 0.57 0.47 0.36
(4.31) (1.29) (0.77) (0.53)
Same state 0.85 0.65 0.51 0.48
(2.43) (1.71) (1.39) (1.11)
Same Census division 0.93 0.66 0.55 0.45
(3.54) (2.13) (1.60) (1.29)
Different Census division 1.18 0.74 0.59 0.47
(8.29) (2.44) (1.69) (1.03)
Average of unmerged banks: 4.24
This table lists the mean variance of return on assets (ROA) for the merged rural and
urban banks for each of the sixteen merger scenarios. Idiosyncratic risk reduction is
observed by reading across a given row because the rows hold the degree of geographical
diversification constant while increasing the number of banks that participate in a
hypotheteical merger. In contrast, market risk reduction is observed by reading down a
given column because the number of banks participating in a merger is held constant
while the degree of geographical diversification increases. Most mean variances of ROA
for the merged banks are significantly lower than the mean pre-merger variances for the
sample banks, which was 0.97 for rural banks and 4.24 for urban banks. The results--
confirmed by t-tests--suggest that community bank mergers reduce significantly
idiosyncratic risk but market risk reduction is insignificant.
Number of banks in merger
TABLE 4
Mean Variance of ROA of Merged Banks
Rural Banks
Urban Banks
Number of banks in mergerFIGURE 1
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